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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
contains a fee-shifting provision, which, provided that a parent 
of a child with a disability has emerged as “a prevailing party” 
in administrative or judicial proceedings challenging violations 
of the Act, renders the parent eligible for an award of attorneys’ 
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fees.  20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B).  The parents in this case 
obtained a court order vindicating their right to an 
administrative due process hearing under the Act, see id. 
§ 1415(f), but the District Court denied their request for 
attorneys’ fees, reasoning that they had received only 
interlocutory procedural relief and, for that reason, were not 
prevailing parties.  Because that conclusion is contrary to this 
Court’s decisions in M.R. v. Ridley School District, 868 F.3d 
218 (3d Cir. 2017), and Bagby v. Beal, 606 F.2d 411 (3d Cir. 
1979), where we explained that success on a claim for 
procedural relief can constitute “a victory ‘on the merits’ that 
confer[s] ‘prevailing party’ status,” M.R., 868 F.3d at 226 
(quoting Bagby, 606 F.2d at 415), we will reverse the District 
Court’s denial of attorneys’ fees and remand for proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
I. Background 
 
Plaintiffs in this case are the parents of three children 
with disabilities, each of whom attended Walter D. Palmer 
Leadership Learning Partners Charter School before it 
permanently closed in December 2014.  This case relates to 
Plaintiffs’ efforts to obtain compensatory education for their 
children under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
(“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482.  Before recounting the 
history of those efforts, we briefly review the statutory 
framework from which Plaintiffs’ claims arose. 
 
A. Statutory Context 
The IDEA provides to children with disabilities “an 
enforceable substantive right to [a free appropriate] public 
education in participating States,” while conditioning federal 
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financial assistance to those states on their “compliance with 
the substantive and procedural goals of the Act.”  Honig v. Doe, 
484 U.S. 305, 310 (1988); see 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1).  
Because Congress was aware that schools had “all too often” 
denied a free appropriate public education to children with 
disabilities “without in any way consulting” the children’s 
parents, the Act also “establishes various procedural 
safeguards that guarantee parents both an opportunity for 
meaningful input into all decisions affecting their child’s 
education and the right to seek review of any decisions they 
think inappropriate.”  Honig, 484 U.S. at 311.  Those 
procedural safeguards allow parents to file an administrative 
complaint challenging “any matter relating to the 
identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the 
child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to 
such child,” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(A); they provide for “an 
impartial due process hearing” in response to such a complaint, 
id. § 1415(f)-(h); and they allow federal district courts to 
“award reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the costs” to 
parents who are “prevailing part[ies]” in the due process 
proceedings, id. § 1415(i)(3)(B).  Should school districts and 
parents wish to sidestep this due process procedure for any 
reason, they may submit to the Act’s statutory mediation 
procedures, see id. §1415(e), which, if successful, culminate in 
legally binding settlement agreements, see id. § 1415(e)(2)(F). 
 
The IDEA’s “elaborate and highly specific procedural 
safeguards” provide parents with a means of enforcing the 
Act’s “general and somewhat imprecise substantive 
admonitions.”  Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 205 
(1982).  For that reason, Congress “placed every bit as much 
emphasis” on school districts’ compliance with those 
procedural safeguards as it did on their compliance with the 
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Act’s substantive standards.  Id. at 205-06.  As the Supreme 
Court has observed, “the importance Congress attached to [the 
IDEA’s] procedural safeguards cannot be gainsaid,” for “the 
congressional emphasis” on those safeguards “demonstrates 
the legislative conviction that adequate compliance with the 
procedures prescribed would in most cases assure much if not 
all of what Congress wished in the way of substantive content.”  
Id. at 206. 
 
The importance of an order enforcing those procedural 
safeguards is the subject of this appeal, the facts of which we 
recount below. 
 
B. Factual and Procedural Background 
Plaintiffs H.E., C.E., and M.T. are parents of children 
with disabilities, and their children were each enrolled at 
Walter D. Palmer Leadership Learning Partners Charter 
School for some time.  While Plaintiffs’ children were enrolled 
there, however, the Charter School did not always satisfy its 
IDEA obligations and at times failed to provide the children 
with a “free appropriate public education.”  20 U.S.C. 
§ 1412(a)(1)(A).  Thus, in 2014, after negotiations with 
Plaintiffs and their attorneys, the Charter School entered with 
Plaintiffs into settlement agreements that fully resolved 
Plaintiffs’ IDEA claims.  Under these agreements, the Charter 
School was to fund a number of hours of compensatory 
education for each child and to contribute towards Plaintiffs’ 
attorneys’ fees.1   
                                              
1 With respect to M.T.’s child, the Charter School also 
agreed to identify an approved private school placement for the 
child, to finalize an individualized education program for that 
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But the Charter School permanently closed in 
December 2014 and never delivered on its obligations under 
the settlement agreements.  In response, Plaintiffs filed 
administrative due process complaints with the Pennsylvania 
Department of Education, naming both the Charter School and 
the Department of Education as defendants.  Plaintiffs alleged 
that their agreements with the Charter School were now 
voidable and contended that, in view of the Charter School’s 
previous failure to provide their children with a free 
appropriate public education, the Department “as the state 
educational agency” should remedy that failure by providing 
compensatory education to their children.  Due Process 
Complaints at 1-2, H.E. v. Walter D. Palmer Leadership 
Learning Partners Charter Sch., No. 15-3864 (E.D. Pa. July 
21, 2016), ECF Nos. 48-2, 48-9, 48-16.  Unfortunately for 
them, the administrative hearing officer promptly dismissed 
the complaints, opining that, rather than seek compensatory 
education from the Department as an entity “ultimately 
responsible” for their children’s education, id., Plaintiffs were 
required to enforce their settlement agreements with the 
Charter School through the Charter School’s settlement-of-
claims process.   
Plaintiffs then filed suit against the Charter School and 
the Department in federal court, seeking “reversal of [the] 
administrative decisions dismissing their claims under the 
IDEA,” remand to the administrative hearing officer, and an 
                                              
placement, to institute progress monitoring, and to reimburse 
associated travel expenses.   
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award of attorneys’ fees and costs.  App. 72, 97.2  Ultimately, 
aside from the requested award of attorneys’ fees and costs, 
Plaintiffs obtained all of the relief they had sought.  The 
District Court vacated the hearing officer’s decisions and 
remanded Plaintiffs’ compensatory education claims to the 
hearing officer for a due process hearing, explaining that the 
hearing officer had “erred as a matter of law” in several 
respects: by assuming that Plaintiffs had sought enforcement 
of their settlement agreements; by, “in effect, enforcing the 
Settlement Agreements against Plaintiffs”; and by “failing to 
render a substantive decision on Plaintiffs’ . . . claims” 
regarding the free appropriate public education that was due to 
their children.  H.E. v. Walter D. Palmer Leadership Learning 
Partners Charter Sch., 220 F. Supp. 3d 574, 583-87 (E.D. Pa. 
2016). 
 
On remand, Plaintiffs and the Department agreed on the 
number of hours of compensatory education owed to Plaintiffs’ 
children, but, because they disagreed about the hourly rate 
applicable to the Department’s compensatory education 
payments, the hearing officer issued a decision setting the 
applicable rate.  The Department challenged that decision in a 
separate case before the District Court, and the District Court 
declined to consolidate that case with this one, on the ground 
                                              
2 With the District Court’s permission, Plaintiffs later 
filed an amended complaint that clarified their allegations 
regarding the Charter School’s conduct toward Plaintiffs 
before the Charter School’s closure but did not change the 
nature of their requests for relief.  As the amended complaint 
is the operative complaint, our analysis below pertains to the 
claims as specified there. 
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that the two cases “d[id] not ‘involve a common question of 
law or fact.’”  Order at 2, H.E. v. Walter D. Palmer Leadership 
Learning Partners Charter Sch., No. 15-3864 (E.D. Pa. June 
21, 2017), ECF No. 71 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a)).  The 
Department’s challenge to the hearing officer’s decision 
remains pending in the District Court. 
 
Meanwhile, Plaintiffs filed a motion for attorneys’ fees 
in this case, citing their successful bids for reversal and remand 
with respect to the hearing officer’s initial decision dismissing 
their administrative complaints.  The District Court denied the 
motion, explaining that its grant of summary judgment did not 
address whether Plaintiffs ultimately would succeed on their 
substantive claims against the Department, “but instead was 
confined to purely procedural matters.”  App. 3.  The District 
Court reasoned that Plaintiffs therefore were “not prevailing 
parties,” and, as a result, it lacked discretion to award Plaintiffs 
any fee award.  App. 3; see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i). 
 
This timely appeal followed.  Plaintiffs contend that 
they in fact were prevailing parties for purposes of the IDEA’s 
attorneys’ fees provision and that they therefore were eligible 
for a fee award.  Our precedent compels us to agree, though we 
first confirm our jurisdiction to consider this appeal before 
addressing the merits of Plaintiffs’ contentions. 
 
II. Jurisdiction3 
 
                                              
3 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1331 and 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(A). 
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The Department has challenged our jurisdiction to hear 
Plaintiffs’ appeal, asserting that the District Court’s order 
denying Plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees “was neither an 
appealable final decision for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 nor 
subject to immediate review under the collateral order 
doctrine.”  Appellee’s Br. 2.  Before addressing the 
Department’s challenge, however, we first resolve the 
jurisdictional defect presented by Plaintiffs’ unresolved claims 
against the Charter School. 
 
The Charter School, though it was named as a defendant 
and submitted a waiver of service in the District Court, never 
filed an appearance.  Thus, the District Court never resolved 
Plaintiffs’ claims against this defendant, and ordinarily we 
would lack appellate jurisdiction because the District Court’s 
orders in this case “terminate[d] fewer than all claims, or 
claims against fewer than all parties.”  Berckeley Inv. Grp., Ltd. 
v. Colkitt, 259 F.3d 135, 140 (3d Cir. 2001).  But in a 
supplemental letter brief, Plaintiffs have “renounced . . . any 
intention to take further action” against the Charter School, 
hence curing the jurisdictional defect otherwise created by the 
Charter School’s presence in this case.  Tiernan v. Devoe, 923 
F.2d 1024, 1031 (3d Cir. 1991).  We accordingly proceed to 
consider the Department’s argument that, even as to Plaintiffs’ 
claims against the Department, the District Court’s orders are 
not final and appealable. 
 
The requirements for a final and appealable order under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291 are oft-repeated: the decision must “fully 
resolve all claims presented to the district court,” and, “after 
the decision has been issued,” there must be “nothing further 
for the district court to do.”  In re Grand Jury, 705 F.3d 133, 
142 (3d Cir. 2012); accord Ray Haluch Gravel Co. v. Cent. 
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Pension Fund of the Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs and 
Participating Emp’rs, 134 S. Ct. 773, 779 (2014); Halle v. W. 
Penn Allegheny Health Sys. Inc., 842 F.3d 215, 227 (3d Cir. 
2016).  In general, “[a] final decision is one by which a district 
court disassociates itself from a case.”  Gelboim v. Bank of Am. 
Corp., 135 S. Ct. 897, 902 (2015). 
 
The District Court has done so here.  With respect to 
Plaintiffs’ claims against the Department, which requested 
(1) “reversal of [the] administrative decisions dismissing their 
claims under the IDEA,” (2) remand to the administrative 
hearing officer, and (3) an award of attorneys’ fees and costs, 
App. 72, the District Court has fully resolved all three of those 
requests.  It granted Plaintiffs’ first two requests when it 
(1) vacated the administrative hearing officer’s decisions 
dismissing Plaintiffs’ administrative complaints and 
(2) remanded Plaintiffs’ cases to the hearing officer “with 
instructions to hold due process hearings.”  App. 15.  And it 
resolved Plaintiffs’ third request when it (3) denied their 
motion for attorneys’ fees and costs.  By remanding the case 
and “retaining nothing of the matter on the federal court’s 
docket,” the District Court has “dissociate[d] itself from the 
case entirely,” and thus we have jurisdiction to review its 
orders.  Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 714 
(1996). 
 
The Department’s arguments to the contrary are 
unavailing.  Although the Department characterizes the 
District Court’s decision regarding attorneys’ fees as an 
“interlocutory order denying interim attorney’s fees” and 
contends that Plaintiffs’ “district court case was not closed,” 
Appellee’s Br. 16-17, the Department’s position contravenes 
the fact that “there [is] nothing further for the district court to 
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do” with respect to Plaintiffs’ claims against the Department, 
In re Grand Jury, 705 F.3d at 142.  Even if Plaintiffs’ 
“substantive claims” against the Department “stayed alive,” 
Appellee’s Br. 17, those claims were not raised in their 
complaint, are the subject of a separate District Court case, and 
therefore do not affect the finality of the orders in this one.   
 
Indeed, when the Department moved to consolidate the 
two cases, the District Court denied the motion because the 
cases did not “involve a common question of law or fact,” 
Order at 2, H.E., No. 15-3864 (E.D. Pa. June 21, 2017), making 
it nearly impossible for challenges to orders in this case to be 
joined to any appeal from the second District Court case, see 
Meinhardt v. Unisys Corp. (In re Unisys Sav. Plan Litig.), 
74 F.3d 420, 432 n.9 (3d Cir. 1996) (noting that, where district 
court cases are not consolidated for trial, parties wishing to 
appeal a final order applicable to just one case must take an 
immediate appeal from that order, even if other related cases 
are pending); see also Fed. R. App. P. (b) (allowing for 
consolidated appeals only when joinder would be 
“practicable”).  Because dismissal of this appeal would have 
“the practical effect of denying later appellate review of [the] 
[D]istrict [C]ourt’s underlying order, the underlying order [is] 
final, within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.”  Carr v. Am. 
Red Cross, 17 F.3d 671, 678 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
The Department’s reliance on Yakowicz v. 
Pennsylvania, 683 F.2d 778, 781-86 (3d Cir. 1982), and In re 
Diet Drugs (Phentermine/Fenfluramine/Dexfenfluramine) 
Prods. Liab. Litig., 401 F.3d 143, 155-57 (3d Cir. 2005), does 
not change our conclusion.  Both of these cases held that we 
lacked jurisdiction to review denials of fee motions where the 
denials were issued while at least some of the plaintiffs’ 
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requests for relief remained pending in the district court.  See 
In re Diet Drugs, 401 F.3d at 146-51; Yakowicz, 683 F.2d at 
781–82.  Here, in contrast, the District Court’s decision 
resolved all of the claims pending in the case, because it denied 
Plaintiffs’ fee motions only after it had already granted all of 
Plaintiffs’ other requests for relief.  Thus, the District Court’s 
order on the fee motion “end[ed] litigation upon the merits and 
[left] nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment,” In 
re Diet Drugs, 401 F.3d at 156 (brackets omitted), so we have 
jurisdiction to consider the merits of Plaintiffs’ appeal.  We 
turn to that task now.4 
III. Eligibility for Attorneys’ Fees 
 
                                              
4 We exercise appellate jurisdiction over the District 
Court’s final order without relying on the collateral order 
doctrine, and thus we express no opinion on whether, in 
another case involving a truly interlocutory request for 
attorneys’ fees, our jurisdiction could also be conferred by that 
doctrine.  Cf. U.S. Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 
456 F.2d 483, 486-87 (3d Cir. 1972). 
Nor do we disturb the principle that an unresolved issue 
of attorney’s fees does not prevent a judgment on the merits of 
the non-fee issues from being final and appealable.  Ray 
Haluch Gravel Co., 134 S. Ct. at 779.  For example, if the 
Department had appealed the District Court’s order remanding 
this case to the administrative hearing officer, which was 
issued months before the District Court’s later denial of 
attorneys’ fees, then the pending fee issue would not have 
divested our Court of jurisdiction. 
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Plaintiffs challenge the District Court’s order denying 
them an award of attorneys’ fees and costs.  We ordinarily 
would review that order for abuse of discretion, but “our 
review is plenary where, as here, the district court based its 
denial on legal conclusions” and “determined, as a threshold 
matter, that [Plaintiffs] were not prevailing parties, so the 
District Court lacked discretion to award any fees.”  M.R., 868 
F.3d at 223 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).  
Applying that plenary standard of review, although we 
appreciate the District Court’s diligence in attempting to apply 
the reasoning of our Court’s earlier decision in J.O. ex rel. C.O. 
v. Orange Township Board of Education, 287 F.3d 267 (3d Cir. 
2002), we ultimately disagree with the District Court’s 
determination on the prevailing party issue.  As explained 
below, our intervening decision in M.R., together with our 
previous opinion in Bagby, which addressed a purely 
procedural victory under a separate statutory scheme, make 
Plaintiffs here eligible for an award of attorneys’ fees under the 
IDEA.  See M.R., 868 F.3d at 225-30; Bagby, 606 F.2d at 413-
15. 
 
In M.R., we addressed the IDEA’s “stay put” provision, 
which at times obliges school districts to reimburse parents for 
a “then-current private educational placement” while due 
process proceedings are pending.  M.R., 868 F.3d at 222 
(brackets omitted) (discussing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j)).  We 
explained that parents who “prevail[ed] with respect to their 
procedural right to reimbursement under the IDEA’s ‘stay put’ 
provision,” even if they “did not succeed with respect to their 
request for a permanent private school placement,” nonetheless 
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obtained “a victory ‘on the merits’ that conferred ‘prevailing 
party’ status.”  Id. at 225-26.5   
 
Similarly, years earlier in Bagby, we considered a 
plaintiff who had brought a procedural due process claim under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and, having been afforded a due process 
hearing, had “accomplished the objectives of her litigation.”  
Bagby, 606 F.2d at 413, 415 (brackets omitted).  Accordingly, 
we held, even though the plaintiff did not obtain a favorable 
result at the hearing itself, the fact that there was a hearing 
meant, with respect to her procedural due process claim, that 
she had obtained the remedy she requested and, thus, she was 
a “prevailing party” under the applicable statutory fee-shifting 
provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1988.  Bagby, 606 F.2d at 415. 
 
Today we hold that Bagby applies equally to parents 
seeking attorneys’ fees under the IDEA’s fee-shifting 
provision, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)—a conclusion to 
which we alluded but did not make explicit in M.R., 868 F.3d 
at 225-30.  That is, if a parent vindicates a procedural right 
                                              
5 In its 28(j) letter concerning M.R., Appellee argues that 
case has no bearing because it “does not say that any ruling 
relating to one aspect of a larger IDEA case . . . is inherently 
merits based.”  Appellee’s 28(j) Letter 1 (Sept. 28, 2017).  
Appellee is correct that M.R. does not sweep so broadly.  But 
it does “import . . . into the IDEA context” the principle that 
“permanent procedural relief,” irrespective of when it is 
awarded in the course of litigation, confers prevailing party 
status “when obtained through an independent merits 
determination,” M.R., 868 F.3d at 226, and for the reasons we 
explain, Plaintiffs here, as in M.R., did obtain such relief. 
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guaranteed by the IDEA, and if the relief she obtains is not 
“temporary forward-looking injunctive relief,” id. at 230, then 
she is a “prevailing party” under the IDEA attorneys’ fee 
provision and is eligible for an award of attorneys’ fees, 
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i).  Particularly given “the 
importance Congress attached” to the IDEA’s procedural 
safeguards, Rowley, 458 U.S. at 205, we readily conclude that 
even a purely procedural victory under the IDEA can confer 
prevailing party status. 
 
Such is the case here, where Plaintiffs vindicated their 
right to an IDEA procedural due process hearing.  See id. 
§ 1415(f).  That remedy, for purposes of Plaintiffs’ procedural 
rights, is permanent relief, cannot be nullified later, and thus is 
not “temporary forward-looking injunctive relief.”  M.R., 868 
F.3d at 230; cf. J.O., 287 F.3d at 273-74.  Plaintiffs therefore 
are “prevailing part[ies]” under the IDEA, and they are eligible 
for an award of “reasonable attorneys’ fees,” 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1415(i)(3)(B)(i), to be set by the District Court in its 
discretion, see M.R., 868 F.3d at 230 & n.9; P.N. v. Clementon 
Bd. of Educ., 442 F.3d 848, 852 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 
 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse and remand 
for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
